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Executive Perks: Compensation and Corporate Performance in China 
 
Abstract 
Many studies have examined CEO compensation in developed countries, where a long 
tradition of disclosure renders data readily available. In emerging economies, particularly in 
China, where market-based compensation is a relatively new phenomenon, there are few 
studies of CEO compensation. In addition, information on the use of non-cash compensation 
is almost absent. Building on the general literature on CEO compensation, and Chinese 
economic and management studies, this article singularly contributes to the extant literature 
by (1) examining the motivational determinants of CEO perk compensation, on the one hand, 
and (2) exploring the relative contribution of perks to performance. We anticipate that perks 
can serve two roles in China: (1) to provide incentives to deter managerial shirking, and (2) to 
facilitate work and improve production. We find that perks are positively associated with 
current and future returns on assets, supporting the view that some types of perks may 
improve firm profitability and/or that perks are paid as a bonus to reward performance. Our 
findings from stratified samples suggest that perks may incentivize managers, even after 








CEO compensation in China is a new subject of inquiry. Prior to the start of China’s 
reforms in 1978, the Chinese economy relied on vestiges of Maoism whose tenets of 
communism dictated similar pay for all ranks of members of society. Even then, however, 
high-ranking officials and powerful elites benefited from preferential treatment and sundry 
perquisites (McGregor, 2005). One of the key elements of economic liberalization has been 
the modernization of economic rules and the corporatization of state-owned enterprises 
(SOE). Listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges are increasingly 
accountable to shareholders, in addition to the state, and incentives have been promulgated to 
induce managers to increase profits and the value of the business. The marketization of the 
Chinese economy necessitated some legal reform by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), which is modeled after U.S. and Hong Kong corporate governance and 
CEO compensation schemes (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006).   
Despite rapid economic reform, socio-economic and political elements of the past 
remain. The state continues to own listed companies, and the state/local government owners 
may exercise operational and strategic control. Compensation systems are often affected by 
local customs, traditions, and institutions (both formal and informal). In some SOEs, 
executive performance evaluations and promotion decisions are based mainly on whether the 
managers satisfy and act in the interests of the Chinese Communist Party and the state (Firth 
et al., 2006). Although political advancement is sometimes the primary motivation, cash 
incentive pay for top management is also a motivation (Kato & Long, 2005). Another type of 
publicly traded firm in China is the family-controlled firm. Previous studies (e.g., Kato & 
Long, 2005) find that cash incentive pay is also used as a motivation tool in family-controlled 
firms. Although some evidence on the positive relationships between current cash 
compensation and performance exists (suggesting the use of cash incentives to motivate 
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management in China and elsewhere), less is known about the relationships between 
performance and other forms of compensation, such as deferred cash compensation, fringe 
benefits, and perks. This paper explores the relationships between perks and performance in 
the Chinese context.     
Non-cash compensation in China, including perquisites such as entertainment, dining, 
cars, travel, drinks and karaoke bars, free personal mobile phones, and so forth, has not been 
well studied.  In the Western context, the compensation literature is inconclusive about the 
impact of such compensation. Some works, for instance Jensen and Meckling (1976), address 
the possible agency problems related to executive perquisites. Other studies point out benefits 
of perks compensation, including tax savings, cost savings, productivity, a reduction in 
disutility from work, and a reduction in employee turnover (Dale-Olsen, 2007; Long & Scott, 
1982; Oyer, 2004; Rajan & Wulf, 2006; Rosen, 2000). This article provides additional 
evidence to the growing literature on the impact of non-cash compensation by testing the 
specific case of China.  
Perks can be an important form of compensation in China for two reasons. First, the 
agency literature suggests that compensation should be linked to performance to deter 
shirking (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In addition to cash, perks may also be paid as a bonus to reward 
performance. Because of social equity pressures, Chinese firms may be constrained in the 
way they can use cash to motivate performance. Perks, which are less observable to the 
public, can be used as a substitute for cash to motivate managers. Herein, we use the term 
“incentive” to denote the use of perk compensation to motivate management to supply a 
proper work effort. Second, perk compensation, such as meals, entertainment, and travel, 
helps companies build useful connections (guanxi) with governmental officials and business 
partners, as guanxi is often built and maintained through lavish meals, banquets, gift giving, 
joint entertainment, and trips (Ai, 2006; Yeung & Tung, 1996). Guanxi has been 
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acknowledged in the literature as an important factor in doing business in China (Ai, 2006; 
Alon, 2003; McGregor, 2005). Luo and Chen (1997), for example, find that guanxi improves 
sales performance.
1
 Since perk expenditures are paid not only as part of executive non-cash 
compensation but also to build and maintain connections, we anticipate that perks will help 
improve firm performance. In addition to guanxi-related perks, we also consider perks that 
help facilitate work in general. Some kinds of perks, such as entertainment expenditures, tend 
to be mostly guanxi-related, i.e., most of the expenditure is likely to be spent on building and 
maintaining guanxi. Other kinds of perks are not completely related to guanxi. For example, a 
firm may provide its executive with a free mobile phone, which can be used for both work 
and personal communication. Only part of this expenditure will be used for the building and 
maintenance of guanxi. Below, the term “productivity” or “productive” benefit is used to 
refer to both guanxi-related and non-guanxi-related benefits of perks.  
Our research question is whether perk compensation is beneficial in China. In 
particular, do Chinese firms pay perks as bonuses to motivate managerial performance (an 
incentive role) and do perks help enhance production (a productive role) in China? Although 
existing empirical evidence from Western countries suggests that non-cash compensation 
may be paid to enhance production or to facilitate work, the incentive role of non-cash 
compensation has not yet been thoroughly examined. The difficulties in investigating the 
incentive role of perks stem from the fact that, regardless whether perks perform an incentive 
role or a productive role, a positive association between perks and performance will be 
observed. This article finds a positive association between perks and current performance in a 
pooled sample. To distinguish between the two roles of perks, we stratify our samples into 
four groups by two dimensions, firm performance and cash compensation paid. If perks are 
                                                 
1   Although most of the previous literature highlights the potential benefits of guanxi on firm 
performance and empirical evidence exists to support this argument, some researchers, such as Chen and Chen 
(2009), believe that guanxi may have negative effects. However, Chen and Chen (2009) do not provide any 
evidence to support this conjecture. 
 6 
paid as bonuses to motivate managers, we anticipate that a strong positive relationship 
between perks and firm performance in a group of firms with lower cash compensation but 
higher firm performance. This is because this group includes firms that use fewer cash 
incentives to motivate managers. Because less cash is paid, cash incentives alone may not be 
sufficient to motivate managers. The better performance of this group implies that it is likely 
that the firms also use perk incentives to complement the cash incentives to motivate 
managers. Hence this group should exhibit the strongest positive relationship between perks 
and firm performance. If perks are paid because of their productive benefits, the relationship 
between perks and firm performance should not vary much across different groups, after 
controlling for other firm characteristics. We find that perks are significantly and positively 
associated with performance only in the group with higher performance but lower cash 
compensation, suggesting that the dominant role of perks in the short run may be an incentive 
role, rather than a productive role.  
In addition to the relationships between perks and current performance, this paper 
examines the relationships between perks and future performance. In the U.S. context, Hayes 
and Schaefer (2000) find that future performance can be explained by current CEO cash 
compensation. One possible explanation for this result is that cash compensation is paid to 
reward managerial effort in the current period, which then contributes to long-term 
profitability. In addition to cash, perks may also be used to reward work effort that is long-
term oriented. Consistent with the findings in the United States, we find that future firm 
performance (for up to three years) is positively associated with both current cash and perk 
compensation.  
A number of studies empirically examine CEO cash compensation in China and its 
relationship to firm performance (the few exceptions include Firth et al., 2006; Kato & Long, 
2005). Firth et al. (2006) suggest that an understanding of the optimal CEO compensation is 
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critical to the success of the economic reform in China. The authors find that pay sensitivities 
to performance are small and that the type of ownership matters. To our knowledge, no study 
to date has examined the relative influence of perk compensation on firm performance in 
China. Empirical evidence from Western countries suggests that non-cash compensation is 
paid because of its productive benefits, tax-savings and cost-savings benefits. Our study 
contributes to the existing empirical literature on non-cash compensation by providing 
empirical evidence to suggest that, in addition to the other benefits previously documented, 
perks can provide incentives to motivate managers to work hard in the Chinese context. Also, 
we find that the design of the cash incentive may influence the extent to which perks are 
positively associated with firm performance. This implies that practitioners should 
simultaneously design cash and non-cash compensation in a comprehensive package, rather 
than using them alone.  
Our paper also has theoretical implications. Although much of the previous literature 
on non-cash compensation focuses on the productive role of perks, our findings suggest that 
perks may serve both incentive and productive roles. Theoretical guidance is needed to 
determine which role will be dominant in which situation and why. Theoretical work that 
simultaneously considers both roles of non-cash compensation will contribute much to our 
knowledge of non-cash compensation and will provide the necessary guidance for future 
empirical research. In addition, although the agency theory literature often considers 
excessive or luxurious perks as agency costs, we provide evidence to suggest that this may 
not be true in the Asian context. The cultural heritage may be one of the most important 
factors in determining an optimal compensation design. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
background on Chinese executive compensation, provides a theoretical overview of perk 
compensation, and develops our research hypotheses. Next, the paper describes the sample 
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data and research methods used in this study, including our models and reports on the 
empirical findings. The paper ends with the discussion of the research findings, limitations, 
and conclusions.  
 
Background on Chinese Executive Compensation and Hypotheses 
A Brief History of the Chinese Compensation System 
There are relatively few studies on compensation in China and they are all recent. The 
scarcity of the literature can be attributed partly to the historical context of compensation in 
planned economies, where regulation trumps market principles in setting wages. Before 1980, 
Chinese state-owned enterprises were controlled by centralized planning whereby managers 
were responsible for meeting output targets. All output was sold to the government 
(Mengistae & Xu, 2004). Compensation, determined centrally, was not based on performance 
(Chow, 1992). The components of compensation included cash compensation, social wages, 
and non-material incentives (recognition and honors) (Chow, 1992). Cash wages were paid 
based on region, industry, and employee characteristics, such as seniority, tenure, education, 
gender, and job title (Bai & Xu, 2005; Kato & Long, 2005). Cash bonuses were divided 
equally among the members of the group, making them more similar to wage supplements 
than to real bonuses (Chow, 1992). Social wages included pension/retirement benefits, 
insurance for illnesses, injuries, accidents, disabilities, and unemployment, maternity 
benefits, medical benefits, and collective benefits (such as subsidized accommodations, 
transportation, child-care, and recreational activities) (Chow, 1992). 
During the 1980s, sweeping changes in the regulatory environment ushered in a new 
era of more liberalized compensation schemes. The Chinese government implemented 
several reforms to modernize executive compensation practices, as described in Mengistae 
and Xu (2004). The first phase of the reform, between 1980 and 1984, introduced various 
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profit retention schemes. The output target was replaced by an output quota, which was 
below full production capacity. The output in excess of the specified quota could be sold on 
the market and the firms could retain a portion of the profits.  
The second phase of the reform, starting from the end of 1984, replaced the profit 
remittances with a profit tax rate of 55 percent. The after-tax profit could be used for 
investment, R&D, and/or bonuses and benefits for employees. Directors were empowered, 
especially in the making of personnel decisions.  During the next phase, Contractual 
Responsibility Systems (CRSs) were implemented, whereby centralized planning was 
replaced by contracts between the SOEs and their supervisory bodies. The contracts, 
stipulating minimum profitability, productivity standards, and investment levels, usually 
lasted for three to four years. By signing a contract, the directors became personally 
responsible and their personal wealth was often held as a performance bond. Because of this 
risk, the directors’ compensation could be up to ten times that of average workers.   
According to Firth et al. (2006), since the economic reform boards of directors now 
determine management compensation based on the recommendations of the controlling 
shareholders. Due to the socialist environment, however, there seems to be a cap on 
management compensation as a multiple of the average worker’s pay. Previous studies find 
executive compensation to range from three times that of an unskilled worker to seven times 
that of an average worker. Stock options are rarely offered. There has been some concern 
about under-compensation because on average the managers’ salaries are only a fraction of 
those in international joint ventures.  
As for the history of non-cash compensation in China, we find that the literature in the 
Chinese context is almost non-existent. In 2004 interviews with Chinese executives, Kato and 
Long (2005) found that the most common perks were a company car and a housing 
allowance. Other perks (the value of which was usually much smaller than the two perks 
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mentioned above) included travel expenses, business gifts, and business apparel expenses. 
Work-related perks such as entertainment expenditures are not included in their study. The 
housing allowance was about 5–6 percent of the annual cash salary. Kato and Long (2005) 
estimate the value of personal use of a company car to be about 12 percent of cash 
compensation. Overall, perks ranged from 15 percent to 32 percent of total compensation. As 
for non-cash compensation in Hong Kong-owned or foreign-owned firms in China, Chiu, Luk, 
and Tang (2002) found that the most common non-cash compensation provided for 
employees at all levels was subsidized meals, accommodations, holiday or entertainment 
facilities, annual leave, paid sick leave, paid maternity leave, paid wedding leave, paid 
compassionate leave, accident insurance, and health insurance. Other allowances (e.g., an 
overtime allowance, illness allowance, and transportation allowance) were also paid. 
 
Theoretical Overview: Perk Compensation in China 
In the classic agency literature originating in the developed countries, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) consider the possibility that executive perquisites represent agency 
problems. A manager only owns a fraction of the firm. Therefore, expenditures for perk 
consumption are borne by all the shareholders, but the benefits are enjoyed primarily only by 
the managers. The managers thus tend to consume too much. It is implicitly assumed here 
that the managers’ cash compensation is independent of their perk consumption, and it is 
costly to monitor perk consumption.  
In opposition to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) argues that managers’ 
wages can be adjusted, ex ante or ex post, to account for the managers’ consumption of perks 
so that the perks can be part of an optimal contract rather than an agency cost. Fama’s (1980) 
view is consistent with the earlier literature on labor and macro-economics, which discusses 
the various benefits of non-cash compensation: (1) economies of scale by providing non-cash 
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compensation to a large number of employees, (2) tax benefits, (3) productivity, i.e.,  the 
beneficial effects of consumption of the good on production, or the reduction in the 
employee’s disutility from work, and (4) a reduction in employee turnover (Dale-Olsen, 2007; 
Long & Scott, 1982; Oyer, 2004; Rajan & Wulf, 2006; Rosen, 2000). One example of a 
perquisite that may have a productive impact is a corporate jet. On the one hand, a corporate 
jet is considered a luxury perquisite for a CEO. On the other hand, traveling by corporate jet 
helps the CEO reach her destination fresh and ready for negotiations or other important tasks.  
Marino and Zábojník (2006) and Adithipyangkul (2007) characterize an optimal 
compensation contract as one that includes both perk and cash compensation. A firm that 
pays productive non-cash compensation will pay less cash and will provide fewer cash 
incentives to motivate managers (Adithipyangkul, 2007). The higher the productivity of the 
non-cash compensation, the greater the amount of non-cash compensation (Adithipyangkul, 
2007; Marino & Zábojník, 2006). Productive perks improve expectations about firm 
performance.  
In addition to being paid as part of a fixed payment, perks may also be paid as a bonus 
to reward performance and hence to motivate employees. In this case, because perks and cash 
are substitutes, if perks are increased, cash bonuses should be reduced accordingly, and one 
should observe a positive relationship between perks and firm performance.  
Empirical research in Western countries provides inconclusive evidence as to whether 
executive perks represent agency costs or an optimal contract design. Yermack (2006), in 
analyzing data on American CEOs’ personal use of company planes, finds a negative 
relationship between perks and stock performance, supporting the argument that perks 
represent agency costs. Rajan and Wulf (2006), however, support Fama’s (1980) view that 
perks can be part of an optimal contract design.  They find that in the U.S. context, perks may 
be paid because they facilitate and enhance the CEO’s work. The authors argue that a 
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company plane tends to be more productive when the company’s headquarters are located in 
a smaller county, or in a remote location far from a large, convenient airport, and when a 
firm’s operations are more geographically dispersed. The authors find that it is more likely 
that a corporate jet will be used in such situations. For employees at the lower levels, 
evidence is mixed regarding whether non-cash compensation or fringe benefits improve 
performance, e.g., whether flexible working hours improve worker productivity (Pierce & 
Newstrom, 1980).  
In the Chinese context, perks can be an important form of compensation because 
Chinese firms tend to be constrained in the way they can use cash to compensate managers. 
Due to social equity pressures, there seems to be a cap on management compensation as a 
multiple of the average worker’s pay (Firth et al., 2006).  Large cash compensations may 
attract criticism and create the perception of unfair income distribution and unwarranted 
managerial privilege. Chinese companies that need to find an alternative tool to motivate 
managers may resort to perk compensations. Perk compensation is less observable to the 
public, and some perks that are work-related may attract less criticism. Therefore, perks can 
be paid as part of the bonus to motivate management. If perks are paid as a bonus to motivate 
managers, a positive association between perks and firm performance should be observed. 
Hypothesis 1: Perk compensation is positively associated with current firm 
performance in China. 
Although a positive association between perks and firm performance can be attributed 
to the use of perks to motivate managers, in China perks may serve another purpose as well. 
The Chinese work environment is encumbered by both market and non-market elements with 
unique institutional features. One such feature affecting perk consumption is the use of 
guanxi to build business relations. Guanxi, loosely defined as “connections,” with 
governmental officials and business partners is crucial for long-term business success, and 
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guanxi is often built through lavish meals, trips, and gift giving (Ai, 2006; Luo & Chen, 
1997; Yeung & Tung, 1996). But guanxi can also lead to nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, and 
some forms of corruption, as defined by Western standards (Alon, 2003).   
Expenditures on entertainment, meals, travel, and communications hence serve two 
purposes in the case of Chinese firms. On the one hand, such perks are consumed by 
managers and hence are considered part of the managers’ total compensation, representing 
the costs to the firm. On the other hand, these expenditures help to build and maintain guanxi, 
which can lead to higher profitability. In addition to guanxi-related benefits, some types of 
perks, such as mobile phones, can help facilitate work in general. Therefore, perks can have 
productive value in China by improving firm performance. No matter whether perks play a 
productive or an incentive role, they will be positively associated with current firm 
performance. 
To differentiate the productive role of perks from the incentive role of perks, we use a 
sample stratification technique. Fama (1980) implies that perk incentives and cash incentives 
are substitutes in the sense that more perk incentives will be introduced if cash compensation 
cannot sufficiently motivate executives. The incentive efficiency of cash compensation is 
investigated through its association with contemporaneous performance. Cash compensation 
is considered under- (over-) paid if it is low (high) when firm performance is good (bad). In 
both of these situations, it seems that cash compensation does not play a sufficient incentive 
role. Additional incentive mechanisms, such as perks, may be needed when the executive is 
under-paid in cash. Such additional incentives through perks are unnecessary, or even 
redundant, however, when cash compensation is adequately paid or over-paid. Thus, if the 
perks are paid to motivate management, we should observe the strongest positive relationship 
between perks and performance in firms that under-pay their executives in terms of cash 
compensation. 
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To execute the above test, we create four sub-samples stratified by two dimensions, 
cash compensation and performance, resulting in four separate groups, as shown in Figure 1 
below.  
Insert Figure 1 here. 
First, consider the case where perks are paid mainly as a substitute for a cash bonus to 
motivate the manager. Group (1), firms with lower cash pay but higher performance, is likely 
to represent the group of firms that use fewer cash incentives to motivate managers. Because 
there are fewer cash incentives, the cash incentives alone may be insufficient to motivate 
managers. The better performance of this group suggests that perk incentives are used to 
complement cash incentives. Hence we anticipate a positive relationship between perks and 
firm performance for group (1). Group (2), firms with higher cash pay and lower performance, 
represents firms with agency problems. The consumption of perks is more likely to be a form 
of the appropriation of private benefits by management. We anticipate a negative relationship 
between firm performance and perks for this group. For groups (3) and (4), cash 
compensation seems to be aligned with performance so that less (more) cash is paid when 
performance is low (high), implying that firms in these groups may not need perk incentives 
to complement cash incentives to motivate managers. Cash incentives alone may be sufficient. 
Thus, the association between perks and performance for groups (3) and (4) should be weaker 
than that for group (1). No relationship will be observed if cash compensation alone can 
sufficiently deter managerial shirking. Our prediction is summarized in Hypothesis 2 below. 
Hypothesis 2: A positive relationship between perks and performance is strongest 
among firms with lower cash compensation but higher performance. 
In contrast, if the main role of perks is to improve productivity rather than to motivate 
managers, then after controlling for the firm characteristics, there may not be much of a 
difference in terms of the size of the positive association between the perks and the current 
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performance for groups (1), (3), and (4). The relationship between perks and cash 
compensation for group (2) may be more subtle because group (2) includes firms with agency 
problems. Some of the perks consumed may actually help improve firm performance, 
whereas others may simply be agency costs that worsen firm profitability. The net effect 
ranges from a smaller positive association to a negative association between perks and 
performance. 
In addition to the relationships between current cash compensation and current 
performance, researchers find positive relationships between current cash compensation and 
future performance (Hayes & Schaefer, 2000). This result can be explained as follows. To 
prevent managerial myopia, any managerial effort in the current period which will lead to 
long-term profitability should be rewarded. A bonus for the current period will thus reward 
short-term-oriented effort and long-term-oriented effort. The latter will result in a positive 
association between current compensation and future performance. In addition to cash, perks 
can also be paid as a bonus to reward long-term-oriented effort. Therefore, current perk 
compensation is expected to be positively associated with future performance. Furthermore, 
perks, especially guanxi-related perks, may benefit a company in the long run. Chinese 
business culture is long-term oriented and guanxi may help ensure business success and 
create long-term competitive advantages (Ai, 2006). Conceptualized in this way, guanxi can 
contribute to a firm’s value creation. This is because reciprocal guanxi relationships are long-
term oriented; a favor done in the current period may be returned in a future period (Park & 
Luo, 2001). Therefore, the expenditures paid to build and maintain guanxi in the current 
period may benefit the firm in future periods. Based on these arguments, we test the 
following hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 3: Perk compensation is positively associated with future firm 
performance in China. 
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As for the control variables, the firm ownership structure in China affects 
compensation practices. Note that in Communist societies social equity is an important issue. 
Large executive compensation may attract criticism. As a result, SOEs are predicted to pay 
less cash compensation. This hypothesis is supported by previous studies on compensation, 
e.g., Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007). Although SOEs are found to pay less cash compensation, 
the relationship between perks and state ownership may be more subtle. On the one hand, 
because of the social equity issues, SOEs may pay less in terms of cash but more in terms of 
perks, because the latter are less observable to the public. On the other hand, in the Chinese 
context, perks such as entertainment and meals are also used to build and maintain guanxi. 
Non-SOEs are endowed with fewer political and governmental connections. Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect that non-SOEs will need to spend more on guanxi-related expenditures 
than SOEs. Therefore, whether or not more perks are paid in SOEs is inconclusive. In 
addition to the ownership structure, we control for other firm characteristics that are found to 
be determinants of cash compensation in China. These variables include firm size, growth 
opportunity, and leverage. 
 
A Benchmark: Cash Compensation in China 
In addition to the analysis based on perks, we investigate the relationship between 
cash compensation and firm performance as a benchmark for comparison. Agency theory 
suggests firms will link pay to performance to motivate managers (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
performance measures should be informative about all aspects of CEO actions that contribute 
to the firm’s short-term and long-term successes (Christensen & Feltham, 2005). Current or 
lagged accounting numbers and stock returns are often used as measures of performance. 
Consistent with the suggestion to use incentive pay to solve agency problems, the cash 
compensation level in China is found to increase returns on sales (profit/sales) (Mengistae & 
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Xu, 2004), (lagged) returns on asset (Conyon & He, 2008; Firth et al., 2007; Li, Moshirian, 
Nguyen, & Tan, 2007), and (lagged) stock returns (Conyon & He, 2008).  
It should be noted here that the relationship between pay and performance may be 
more complicated in China than it is in developed economies. There are two types of Chinese 
firms: SOEs and family-controlled enterprises. In family-controlled firms, managers are often 
members of the owning families so that ownership and control are not separate and incentives 
are less important to deter managerial shirking. In SOEs, the state has an alternative tool to 
motivate managers, i.e., political advancement, so it may not need to strongly link pay to 
performance. In short, Chinese firms may not need to use incentive pay to solve the agency 
problems between principal and agent. However, in addition to the moral hazard problems 
whereby the principal’s and the agent’s interests are not aligned, another type of agency 
problems, called principal-principal agency problems, also exists in China. Principal-
principal agency problems arise when interests of the majority shareholders (of either the 
state or the controlling family) are not aligned with those of the minority shareholders 
(Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). For instance, the state may not allow 
employee layoffs, even when layoffs will be beneficial, because it wants to control 
unemployment rates.  
Since the compensation reform in China, executive pay has been linked to 
performance. Researchers (e.g., Firth et al., 2007) generally argue that pay for performance 
will solve the moral hazard problems between the principal (owner) and the agent (manager). 
However, pay for performance may also help solve principal-principal agency problems 
(Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). In SOEs, where the state may be more 
concerned about goals other than profit maximization and where political advancement is 
used to motivate managers to achieve these goals, linking pay to performance helps to 
motivate managers to be concerned about firm performance and hence to be concerned about 
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minority shareholders. In family-controlled firms, linking the manager’s/owner’s pay to 
performance makes asset misappropriations more costly to the manager because by “stealing” 
from the company, the manager receives less compensation. Based on the agency theory 
predictions above, we anticipate that cash compensation is positively associated with a firm’s 
current performance. 
It should be noted that accounting numbers, which measure firm performance in most 
previous studies, are based on history and may be short-term oriented. They may not capture 
CEO actions that contribute to business success in the long run. However, unobservable 
performance information may be reflected in the firm’s future performance (Hayes & 
Schaefer, 2000). Thus researchers may be able to use future firm performance as a proxy for 
the unobservable performance measure that is long-term oriented. Using U.S. data, Hayes and 
Schaefer (2000) find that future performance can be explained by current CEO compensation.  
Chinese business culture is long-term oriented (Park & Luo, 2001). To mitigate 
counter-productive myopic behavior, managerial efforts for the long-term prospects of the 
company should be rewarded. Thus, similar to that in the U.S. setting, we anticipate that 
current cash compensation is positively associated with future performance in Chinese 
companies. 
The Chinese government has tried to modernize compensation practices since the 
1980s. However, due to the Communist legacy and the social equity pressures, SOEs are 
expected to pay less cash compensation, possibly to avoid criticism from the public (Conyon 
& He, 2008; Firth et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007). In non-SOEs, which are 
mostly family businesses, there should be less pressure regarding the amount of executive 
compensation. Therefore, we anticipate that the level of cash compensation is lower in SOEs 
than in non-SOEs.  
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The control variables included in our analysis include firm size, growth opportunity, 
and leverage, as suggested by the previous literature. Mengistae and Xu (2004), Firth et al. 
(2006), Firth et al. (2007), Li et al. (2007), and Conyon and He (2008) find that the 
compensation level increases with firm size, possibly because larger firms are more complex 
and hence require more management skills or because they have a larger resource base to 
attract top talent. Growth opportunity is also found to be positively associated with executive 
compensation (Conyon & He, 2008), possibly because a high-growth firm requires a more 
competent manager who deserves higher pay. In addition to shareholder monitoring, Firth et 
al. (2007) find that CEO compensation decreases in the degree of leverage, implying that 
monitoring by debt holders reduces CEO compensation. Additionally, we control for the year 
of operation and the industry effects.  
 
Sample and Methodology 
Sample and Data Sources 
In the footnotes to their cash flow statements, Chinese listed companies are required 
to disclose cash expenditures for a list of operating items, such as meals and travel, 
transportation, communications, entertainment, R&D, advertising, and so forth. We manually 
collected all the items disclosed in these notes for all public companies traded on the Chinese 
stock markets from 1999 to 2004. Some of these expenditures are partially consumed by 
managers. Company cars and mobile phones, for example, are used for both work and 
personal transportation and communications. We anticipate that expenditures for meals, 
travel, company cars, communications, socializing, and entertainment involve personal 
consumption by management. The sum of these expenditures is denoted by PERKS1, which 
is a proxy for management perquisites. Because we could not determine the extent to which 
the expenditures are spent for the management’s personal consumption, the variable PERK1 
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may not be a good proxy for management perquisites. Therefore, we also focused on the 
types of perks that seem to involve more of the managers’ personal consumption, i.e., 
expenditures for meals, travel, and entertainment. The sum of these expenditures is denoted 
as PERKS2.  
As a benchmark to compare with perk compensation, we also compiled the cash 
compensation for the top three executives in the company. The cash compensation data were 
collected from a database for China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR). The 
market and accounting data were also retrieved from CSMAR. The final sample includes 
3,706 firm-year observations with available data for both perks and cash compensation. The 
distribution of the sample by fiscal year is reported in Panel A of Table 1. The number of 
firms by year increases from 161 in 2000 to 973 in 2004, indicating a growing number of 
firms listed on the Chinese stock markets as well as an improvement in disclosure quality. 
The distribution of the sample by industry is reported in Panel B of Table 1. More than 50 
percent of our sample firms are in the manufacturing sector. This is consistent with the 
industry structure of the Chinese stock market.  
Insert Table 1 (Panel A & B) About Here 
 
Research Design 
We ran two regression models to investigate the relationships between current 
compensation and contemporaneous performance and between current compensation and 
future performance. First, we tested whether compensation was positively associated with 
current performance, with a particular emphasis on perk compensation. Second, we examined 
the relationship between firm current compensation and future performance.   
 
Current Compensation and Current Performance 
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To test Hypothesis 1 (whether perks are positively associated with current 
performance), and Hypothesis 2 (whether the positive association between perks and 
performance is strongest in firms with less cash compensation and better performance), we 
followed the literature on executive compensation to run the following model for perks. We 
also ran the model for cash compensation as a benchmark for comparison.  
PERKit (COMPENSATIONit)  =   + 1 ROAit + 2 STATEit + 3 LOG_SALESit  
                                              + 4 LEVERAGEit + 5 MBit + YEAR + INDUSTRY + it,      (1) 
where  
PERKSit is the logarithm of perks for firm i in year t. 
COMPENSATIONit is the logarithm of cash compensation paid for the top three executives 
for firm i in year t. 
ROAit is the return on assets for firm i in year t. 
STATEit is the indicator for state-owned enterprises, which equals 1 if the firm is controlled 
by the state and 0 otherwise. 
LOG_SALESit , the proxy for size, is the logarithm of sales for firm i in year t. 
LEVERAGEit is the ratio of total liability to total assets for firm i in year t. 
MBit is the market-to-book equity ratio for firm i in year t. 
YEAR stands for the yearly fixed effect. 
INDUSTRY stands for the industrial effect. 
In addition to the test variables, the control variables included in our analysis were 
firm size, leverage, growth opportunity, year of operation, and industry effects, as suggested 
by the previous literature. The standard error was clustered by firms with regard to repetition 
of the same firm in the analysis. This model was performed in the pooled sample to provide 
general evidence as to whether or not perks were generally positively associated with 
performance.  
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We also ran the regression model for four sub-samples stratified by two dimensions, 
cash compensation and performance. The pooled sample was stratified into two sub-samples 
of firms with higher or lower cash compensation, with the median of the average cash 
compensation as the cutoff point. Then each sub-sample was stratified into two sub-samples 
of firms with higher or lower performance, with the median of the average ROA as the cutoff 
point. A firm with an average ROA above the median of the average ROA of each firm from 
1999 to 2004 was regarded as having higher performance, whereas a firm with average 
compensation for the top three executives above the median of that for each firm from 1999 
to 2004 was regarded as having higher pay. The stratification resulted in four sub-samples: (1) 
firms with lower cash compensation and higher performance, (2) firms with higher cash 
compensation and lower performance, (3) firms with lower cash compensation and lower 
performance, and (4) firms with higher cash compensation and higher performance.  
 
Current Compensation and Future Performance 
To investigate the relationships between current compensation and future 
performance, we ran the following model. 
     

ROA it  j   1COMPENSATION it  2PERKS it  3ROA it  4STATE it
5LOG _ SALES it  6LEVERAGE it  7MB it YEAR  INDUSTRY  it ,    
(2) 
where  
ROAit+j is the returns on assets for firm i in year t+j and j equals 1, 2, and 3 alternatively.  
All the remaining variables are defined in the same way as those in model (1). 
As suggested by Hayes and Schaefer (2000), if some unobservable aspects of 
performance are reflected in future performance and the managers are rewarded based on the 
unobservable performance measures, current cash compensation is expected to be positively 
associated with future firm performance. In other words, 1 is expected to be positive. In 
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addition, because perks (especially guanxi-related perks) may help improve performance in 
the long run or may be paid to reward management long-term oriented effort, 2 is expected 




Descriptive statistics  
Panel A of Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of perks and cash compensation. 
PERKS1, which includes expenditures for meals, travel, company car, socializing, 
communications, and entertainment, has a mean and a median of 4.73 and 1.39, respectively. 
PERKS2, which includes only meals, travel, and entertainment expenditures, has a mean and 
a median of 4.00 and 1.06, respectively, each of which is only marginally lower than that of 
PERKS1. This means that meals, travel, and entertainment expenditures, which help 
managers build and maintain guanxi, are the main components of perks in Chinese firms. 
Compared with perks, cash compensation has a mean and a median of 0.42 and 0.30 
respectively, which are both much lower than the perks consumed in the company. This 
difference can be attributed to the fact that perks are consumed by the entire management 
team whereas compensation is confined to the top three executives in the company.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the firm’s performance, 
measured as returns on assets (ROA) and other control variables, i.e., leverage, size, and 
market-to-book equity ratio. The variable STATE, which is an indicator for state-controlled 
firms, shows that about 79 percent of the firms in our sample are controlled by the state. We 
control for this ownership effect in all the models because we anticipate that the 
compensation structure, including perks and compensation, may vary between state- and non-
state-controlled firms.  
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Insert Table 2 (Panels A & B) About Here 
 
Current Compensation and Current Performance 
We anticipate that perks and current performance in China will be positively 
associated since perks are paid as a bonus to motivate management (Hypothesis 1). Table 3 
reports the baseline model of the association between perks (cash compensation) and 
contemporaneous firm performance. The coefficients of the ROA in models (1) and (2) with 
PERKS1 and PERKS2 as the dependent variables are both 0.07, significant at the 5 percent 
level, supporting Hypothesis 1. We also anticipate the use of cash compensation for 
performance to mitigate agency problems so that cash compensation should increase as firm 
performance increases. The coefficient of the ROA is 0.019, with a significance level at 1 
percent, for cash compensation. This suggests that cash compensation is linked to 
performance in China.   
Insert Table 3 About Here 
In addition to performance, the level of compensation may be determined by the firm 
ownership structure. Non-SOEs are endowed with fewer political connections and hence may 
need to incur more expenditures to build guanxi. As a result, perks are expected to be higher 
in non-SOEs. We find that the STATE variable, an indicator for state-controlled firms, is not 
significantly associated with perks.  
 Cash compensation is regulated in state-controlled firms. Social equity pressures 
possibly limit the amount of cash compensation that SOEs can award managers. Cash 
compensation is thus expected to be lower in SOEs due to social equity concerns. The 
STATE variable is significantly negative in model (3), which means that formal cash 
compensation in state-controlled firms is lower than that in non-state-controlled firms.  
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The coefficients for the remaining control variables are consistent with the findings in 
previous studies. Large and growing firms are more likely to pay higher cash compensation 
and perks to management, whereas highly leveraged firms will pay lower. The association 
between perks and firm fundamentals is the same as that between cash compensation and 
firm fundamentals. This provides evidence that perks and cash may be substitutes.   
Table 4 reports the regression results for the four stratified sub-samples. The pooled 
sample is stratified by the level of cash compensation and by the ROA into four sub-samples: 
(1) firms with lower cash compensation but better performance, (2) firms with higher cash 
compensation but worse performance, (3) firms with lower cash compensation and worse 
performance, and (4) firms with higher cash compensation and better performance.  
Insert Table 4 about Here 
 
Group (1) includes firms with lower cash compensation but higher performance. This 
group is likely to represent firms that use fewer cash incentives to motivate performance. 
More perk compensation is expected to be paid as a substitute for cash bonuses to motivate 
performance, compared with firms in groups (3) and (4). Group (2) includes firms with 
higher cash compensation but lower performance. This group represents firms with agency 
problems so here we expect no or a negative relationship between perks and firm 
performance for this group. In short, we anticipate the strongest positive relationship between 
perks and firm performance for group (1) (Hypothesis 2).  
The results for groups (1) and (2) are reported in Panel A of Table 4. Consistent with 
the stratification criteria, the association between cash compensation and performance 
becomes much weaker than that in the pooled sample analysis in Table 3. Cash compensation 
does not seem to have much of an incentive effect in these two sub-samples. However, the 
association between perks and performance becomes much stronger among firms with higher 
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performance and lower pay in group (1). The coefficient of ROA with PERKS1 (PERKS2) as 
the dependent variable increases from 0.070 (0.071) in Table 3 to 0.354 (0.403) (see model [1] 
and model [2] in Panel A of Table 4 respectively). The relationships are statistically 
significant. The association between perks and performance becomes much weaker among 
firms with lower performance but higher pay in group (2). The coefficient of ROA with 
PERKS1 (PERKS2) as the dependent variable decreases from 0.070 (0.071) in Table 3 to 
 -0.08 (-0.068) (see model [4] and model [5] in Panel A of Table 4 respectively). The 
relationships between perks and performance for group (2) are negative, but insignificant.  
The empirical evidence for the association between perks and compensation with 
performance for firms in groups (3) and (4) is provided in Panel B of Table 4 as a benchmark 
reference. These are firms with higher performance and higher pay or firms with lower 
performance and lower pay (cash pay and performance are linked). The association between 
cash compensation and firm performance becomes stronger for group (4). But we did not find 
any significant association between perks and firm performance. Overall, the results in Table 
4 support Hypothesis 2. The main role of perks seems to be to reward current performance 
rather than to improve current performance. 
 
Current Compensation and Future Performance 
Because perks can be paid as a bonus to reward long-term-oriented work effort or 
perks may have long-term productive benefits, we anticipate a positive relationship between 
perks and future performance (Hypothesis 3). Our findings support this hypothesis, as shown 
in Table 5. The variable PERKS is positively associated with future performance. Future 
performance increases with current perks for up to three years. Additionally, current cash 
compensation may be positively associated with future performance because future 
performance may capture information about long-term-oriented managerial performance and 
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cash bonuses are paid to reward long-term- oriented performance. The coefficient for 
COMPENSATION is positive and significant.  
Insert Table 5 about Here 
 
Discussion  
As suggested by agency theory, much of the compensation literature considers the 
relationships between cash compensation and performance. Some of the previous studies in 
Western countries that examine the relationships between perks and performance find 
inconclusive evidence as to whether perks represent agency costs or an optimal compensation 
contract design.
2
 Whether non-cash compensation has productive value is also inconclusive. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has investigated the relationships between 
perks and performance in the Chinese context.  
Contrary to evidence from Western countries (e.g., Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006), our 
research suggests that perks are an important form of compensation in China. On average, top 
executives in Chinese companies spend about 4-5RMB million per year on perks, in contrast 
to average cash pay of about 0.42RMB million per year. Our results suggest that perks are 
paid as a substitute for cash to motivate managers and to improve performance in the long 
run. 
Previous empirical studies, such as Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Oyer (2004), show 
that perks are more likely to be paid when they are expected to improve or facilitate 
production. Whether or not non-cash compensation actually leads to better performance is 
still inconclusive (Pierce & Newstrom, 1980). Our paper contributes to the literature by 
providing additional evidence about the benefits of perks. We find that perks are positively 
associated with both current performance (in Table 3) and with future performance (in Table 
                                                 
2  See, for example, Yermack (2006) and Dale-Olsen (2007). 
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5), suggesting that non-cash compensation may have productive benefits and may be used to 
motivate managers.  
Our results that show that perks are positively associated with firm performance 
contradict findings by Yermack (2006), possibly because Yermack (2006) considers perks 
that are not related to work (e.g., personal use of a company aircraft), whereas we consider 
perks that help to build and maintain guanxi or perks that can help facilitate work. The 
positive association between perks and performance indicates that perks may not always 
simply represent agency costs whereby managers abuse the firm’s resources through 
overconsumption. In contrast, our findings support Rosen (2000) and others who propose a 
possible beneficial impact of such compensation on production. 
Although much of the previous empirical work in Western countries investigates the 
productive role of non-cash compensation,
3
 our findings based on stratified samples in Table 
4 suggest that perks may also be paid to motivate managers in China. In Table 4, we find that 
perks are positively associated with performance only for group (1). In other words, firms 
that use fewer cash incentives are found to use perk incentives to augment the cash 
incentives, as implied by the positive association between perks and current performance. We 
find no significant association for those firms that use more cash incentives in groups (3) and 
(4). This implies that perks may be paid to motivate managers rather than to enhance 
production. Although we cannot exclude the possibility of short-term productivity from 
perks, this study contributes to the existing literature by suggesting that perks may be paid as 
a substitute for cash to reward managers.  
The findings from the stratified sub-samples indicate that some firms may align perk 
incentives better than others, thus exhibiting a strong positive relationship between 
performance (ROA) and perk compensation. It should be noted that even for those firms that 
                                                 
3  See, for example, Dale-Olsen (2007), Oyer (2004), and Rajan & Wulf (2006). 
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seem to be afflicted by agency problems in group (2), the association between perks and 
performance is not significantly negative. If perks are purely a misappropriation of the 
shareholders’ wealth, one may anticipate that excessive perks will lead to worse performance, 
so a significant negative association should be observed for group (2). The reason for an 
insignificant relationship may possibly be that some of the perk-related expenditures are 
spent productively, for example, to build guanxi, which helps improve firm performance. The 
extra expenditures that are misappropriated by management worsen performance. The two 
opposing forces possibly result in insignificant relationships between perks and performance. 
Although we find that some companies use fewer cash incentives but more perk 
incentives than their peers to mitigate agency problems, our results imply that cash is still the 
main incentive tool for some companies. For firms with lower (higher) performance and 
lower (higher) cash compensation, perks are not significantly related to performance, 
implying that some firms may choose to motivate managers through cash incentives rather 
than through perk bonuses.  
In addition to perks, our research investigates the comparative relationships between 
cash compensation and current and future performance. Similar to perks, cash compensation 
is found to be positively associated with current performance in the pooled sample. This 
result is consistent with previous Chinese studies, such as Mengistae & Xu (2004), Conyon & 
He (2008), Firth et al. (2007), and Li et al. (2007), which also report on the use of pay for 
performance in Chinese companies. Incentive pay may be used to deter the agency problems 
between the principal (shareholders) and the agent (managers) or to deter the agency 
problems between the principal (majority shareholders) and the principal (minority 
shareholders). Moreover, we anticipate that cash compensation should be positively 
associated with future performance, because some aspects of managerial effort which are 
long-term oriented and which are not observable to researchers may be captured by future 
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performance. We find that cash compensation is positively related to future performance, 
consistent with the findings by Hayes and Schaefer (2000), which are based on U.S. data. 
This suggests that Chinese firms reward managerial effort related to both the short-term and 
long-term prospects of the company. 
Furthermore, we anticipate that Chinese SOEs may use perks to compensate their 
managers competitively in the labor market. Since they may be limited in the amount they 
can give in the form of cash compensation (either because of regulations or institutional 
pressures), perks provide the firm with the ability to “hide” the total compensation package 
behind more opaque forms of compensation that are harder to track and criticize. Our 
research finds that state ownership has a negative and significant impact on cash 
compensation, as revealed in previous studies such as Firth et al. (2007). However, state 
ownership does not have a significant impact on perk compensation.  This is possibly because 
on the one hand, a SOE faces more serious social equity pressures and therefore pays more in 
terms of perks because perks are more opaque to the public. On the other hand, non-SOEs 
may spend more on perks due to greater needs to build and maintain guanxi with politicians 
and government officials as well as suppliers and buyers.  
Our findings relating to the relationships between cash compensation and the control 
variables are consistent with previous studies, such as Firth et al. (2007), Li et al. (2007), and 
Conyon and He (2008). We provide additional evidence on the relationships between perks 
and the variables that are the determinants of cash compensation in the previous literature. 
Table 3 shows that large companies with high sales volume are more likely to give both 
higher cash compensation and higher perk compensation; leverage has a negative and 
significant impact on both cash compensation and perk compensation, but the impact on perk 
compensation is more than five times larger. This suggests that companies in China whose 
ratio of total liability to total assets is larger are less likely to afford perks than they are able 
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to afford cash compensation. The coefficient of market-to-book equity ratio (which measures 
future potential) is positive and significant for both cash compensation and perks, but the 
relative impact on perks is much larger (more than eight times larger for PERKS 1). Possibly 
this is because firms with more growth opportunities tend to invest more in perks to build 
guanxi.   
In summary, our study contributes to the compensation literature by extending the 
agency literature that originated in the West to the Chinese context. Excessive or luxurious 
perks are often viewed as agency costs in the Western context. Our evidence suggests that 
excessive or luxurious perks such as lavish meals should not always be perceived of as 
management’s theft of shareholders’ wealth. Perk compensation is found to be positively 
associated with firm performance. The cultural context seems to be one of the most important 
factors in determining whether the Western theory is applicable to Asian settings. Previous 
empirical compensation literature focuses on the incentive role of cash compensation and the 
productive role of non-cash compensation. Our results suggest that perks can be paid both to 
motivate managers to supply greater efforts and to facilitate work. In other words, perks can 
perform both incentive and productive roles. Also, we find that the design of cash incentive 
compensation may influence the extent to which perks are positively related to firm 
performance. This leads to the practical implication that firms should carefully design both 
cash and non-cash compensation schemes simultaneously and comprehensively rather than 
designing each separately.     
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Asian countries are gaining economic prominence, but there are still many gaps in the 
existing literature and hence many unexplored research questions related to human resource 
management practice in Asia (Budhwar & Debrah, 2009). More research is needed on non-
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cash compensation in Asian countries. We provide a first empirical at this important feature 
of compensation reform in China. But data are still lacking.  For example, when data become 
available on stock options, comparisons with Western firms will be useful. Over time, 
however, the structure of compensation will change and replicated work may be required. In 
addition, we propose two reasons for why perks are positively associated with firm 
performance – (1) perks help facilitate work and build and maintain guanxi and guanxi in 
turn leads to business success, and (2) perks are paid as a bonus to mitigate agency problems. 
Because data on the breakdown of perks into fixed compensation components and bonus 
components are not publicly available, we cannot know to what extent perks are paid as part 
of fixed compensation to facilitate work or to build guanxi and to what extent perks are paid 
as bonuses to deter managerial shirking. Future case-study or survey research that gathers 
detailed data on the breakdown of perks into these two components will help us better 
understand the use of perk compensation in China.  
 In addition, although much of the previous literature focuses on the incentive role of 
cash compensation and the productive role of non-cash compensation, our results suggest that 
non-cash compensation can actually serve both roles. Future analytical research, considering 
both the incentive and productive roles simultaneously, is needed to provide guidance for 
non-cash compensation.  
 Furthermore, although the compensation literature often examines the use of incentive 
pay to solve the moral hazard problems between the principal and the agent, less of the earlier 
work considers the use of the compensation design to solve the principal-principal agency 
problems. A formal theory is needed to distinguish the use of incentive pay to solve principal-
agent agency problems from the use of incentive pay to solve principal-principal agency 
problems. 
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Finally, there is a need to test the theories of compensation in relation to unique 
environments, in China or elsewhere, in order to develop general explanations across 
different systems. Although perks seem to be viewed rather negatively by investors in the 
West and the evidence is inconclusive as to the effects of perks on firms, the relationship 
between perks, especially guanxi-related perks, and firm performance may be different in 
East Asia where networking is a key to business success. Future studies should extend this 
framework to other countries, in both the developing and developed contexts.  
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Table 1 Sample Description 
Panel A: By year  
This panel presents the sample distribution by year.  
 
Year Number 
As percentage of 
sample 
1999 199 5% 
2000 161 4% 
2001 646 17% 
2002 843 23% 
2003 884 24% 
2004 973 26% 
Total           3,706 100% 
  
 
Panel B: By industry  





Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, and Fishing 72 2% 
Mining 54 1% 
Manufacturing     2127 57% 
Production and Distribution of Electricity, Gas, and Water       195 5% 
Construction 62 2% 
Transport, Storage, and Posts       154 4% 
Information Transmission, Computer Services, and 
  Software 197 5% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 252 7% 
Real Estate 172 5% 
Management of Water Conservancy, Environment and 
 Public Facilities 103 3% 
Culture, Sports, and Entertainment   14 0% 
Conglomerates 304 8% 
Total 3706 100% 
 39 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Perks and compensation 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the level of perk and cash compensation. 
PERKS1 is defined as the sum of expenditures for meals, travel, company cars, 
communications, socializing, and entertainment in the fiscal year. PERKS2 is defined as the 
expenditures for meals, travel, and entertainment in the fiscal year. COMPENSATION is the 
total cash compensation paid to the top three executive officers in the fiscal year. All the 
variables are measured in one million RMB. 
 
VARIABLE N MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
PERKS1 3706 4.73 1.39 7.95 
PERKS2 3706 4.00 1.06 6.72 
COMPENSATION 3706 0.42 0.30 0.37 
 
Panel B: Financial variables and stock return 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the financial data. ROA, return on assets, is 
defined as the net income divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. LEVERAGE is 
the ratio of total liability to total assets at the end of the fiscal year. MTB, the market-to-book 
equity ratio, is defined as the ratio of the market value to the book value of equity at the end 
of the fiscal year. LOG_SALES is the log of total sales in the fiscal year. STATE, the 
indicator for state-controlled firms, equals 1 if the company is controlled by the local or 
central government, and 0 if it is controlled by entrepreneurs.  
 
  N MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
ROA (%) 3706 2.274 2.854 5.695 
LEVERAGE 3706 0.467 0.469 0.180 
MTB 3706 3.729 2.938 2.533 
LOG_SALES 3706 20.264 20.233 1.175 
STATE 3706 0.793 1.000 0.405 
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Table 3 Association of perks and compensation with firm performance 
 
This table provides the regression results for the association of perks and compensation with firm 
performance. The dependent variable is the log of PERKS1 plus one, PERKS2 plus one, and 
COMPENSATION plus one respectively in Models (1) to (3). The independent variables include: 
ROA, return on assets, measured as the net income divided by the total assets at the end of the 
fiscal year, STATE, an indicator variable, takes the value of 1 for state-controlled firms, and 0 
otherwise, LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liability to total assets at the end of the fiscal year, 
MTB, market-to-book equity ratio, measured as the ratio of market value to book value of equity 
at the end of the fiscal year, and LOG_SALES, the logarithm value of total sales in the fiscal year. 
An OLS model with standard errors clustered by firm is applied. Yearly and industrial fixed 
effects are controlled but not reported. *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION 
ROA 0.070 0.071 0.019 
 (2.24)** (2.23)** (5.58)*** 
STATE -0.097 -0.129 -0.175 
 (0.20) (0.26) (3.55)*** 
LOG_SALES 0.364 0.337 0.268 
 (1.79)* (1.66)* (11.88)*** 
LEVERAGE -2.323 -2.224 -0.434 
 (1.79)* (1.73)* (3.23)*** 
MTB 0.191 0.159 0.023 
 (2.08)** (1.72)* (2.22)** 
Constant 1.351 1.973 6.277 
 (0.33) (0.48) (14.33)*** 
Observations 3706 3706 3706 




Table 4 Association of perks and compensation with firm performance in sub-samples 
Panel A: Firms with under- or over-paid cash compensation 
This panel presents the regression results of the association of perks and compensation with firm performance among firms with higher 
performance and lower cash compensation and firms with lower performance and higher cash compensation. Firms with an average ROA above 
the median of the average ROA of each firm from 1999 to 2004 are regarded as firms with higher performance and firms with lower 
performance otherwise. Firms with an average cash compensation for the top three executives above the median of that for each firm from 1999 
to 2004 are regarded as firms with higher pay, and firms with lower pay otherwise. The dependent variable is the log of PERKS1 plus one, 
PERKS2 plus one, and COMPENSATION plus one respectively in Models (1) to (3) and Models (4) to (6). The independent variables include: 
ROA, return on assets, measured as the net income divided by the total assets at the end of the fiscal year, STATE, an indicator variable, takes 
the value of 1 for state-controlled firms, and 0 otherwise, LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liability to total assets at the end of the fiscal year, 
MTB, market-to-book equity ratio, measured as the ratio of market value to book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year, and LOG_SALES, 
the logarithm value of total sales in the fiscal year. An OLS model with standard errors clustered by firm is applied. Yearly and industrial fixed 
effects are controlled but not reported.  *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Firms with higher performance but lower cash pay Firms with lower performance but higher cash pay 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
  PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION 
ROA 0.354 0.403 0.019 -0.080 -0.068 0.004 
 (2.45)** (2.86)*** (1.71)* (1.32) (1.11) (1.33) 
STATE 0.365 0.495 0.006 -1.616 -1.641 -0.164 
 (0.28) (0.38) (0.07) (1.49) (1.51) (2.66)*** 
LOG_SALES -0.159 -0.225 0.062 0.190 0.129 0.142 
 (0.30) (0.43) (1.54) (0.42) (0.28) (6.21)*** 
LEVERAGE 1.342 2.505 -0.046 -1.350 -0.285 -0.121 
 (0.41) (0.78) (0.17) (0.41) (0.09) (0.69) 
MTB -0.464 -0.609 0.009 0.047 -0.000 0.008 
 (1.66)* (2.35)** (0.54) (0.23) (0.00) (0.69) 
Constant 13.148 14.044 9.684 3.714 4.893 9.276 
 (1.30) (1.42) (13.30)*** (0.40) (0.53) (21.04)*** 
Observations 755 755 755 756 756 756 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.35 0.05 0.05 0.37 
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Table 4 Association of perks and compensation with firm performance in sub-samples 
Panel B: Firms with cash compensation aligned with performance 
This panel presents the regression results of the association of perks and compensation with firm performance in firms with lower performance 
and lower cash pay and firms with higher performance and higher cash pay. Firms with an average ROA above the median of the average ROA 
for each firm from 1999 to 2004 are regarded as firms with higher performance, and firms with lower performance otherwise. Firms with an 
average cash compensation for the top three executives above the median of that for each firm from 1999 to 2004 are regarded as firms with 
higher cash pay, and firms with lower cash pay otherwise. The dependent variable is the log of PERKS1 plus one, PERKS2 plus one, and 
COMPENSATION plus one respectively in Models (1) to (3) and Models (4) to (6). The independent variables include: ROA, return on assets, 
measured as the net income divided by the total assets at the end of the fiscal year, STATE, an indicator variable, takes the value of 1 for state-
controlled firms, and 0 otherwise, LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liability to total assets at the end of the fiscal year, MTB, market-to-book 
equity ratio, measured as the ratio of the market value to the book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year, and LOG_SALES, the logarithm 
value of total sales in the fiscal year. An OLS model with standard errors clustered by firm is applied. The yearly and industrial fixed effects are 
controlled but not reported.  *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Firms with lower performance and lower cash pay Firms with higher performance and higher cash pay 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
  PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION 
ROA 0.043 0.039 0.009 0.153 0.148 0.041 
 (1.03) (0.94) (2.43)** (1.21) (1.15) (4.44)*** 
STATE 0.452 0.310 -0.154 0.505 0.499 -0.153 
 (0.56) (0.39) (2.32)** (0.57) (0.57) (2.69)*** 
LOG_SALES 0.942 1.047 0.093 -0.173 -0.248 0.124 
 (2.72)*** (3.05)*** (2.71)*** (0.41) (0.60) (4.94)*** 
LEVERAGE -3.030 -3.320 -0.203 0.061 -1.192 0.125 
 (1.49) (1.65) (1.16) (0.02) (0.39) (0.74) 
MTB 0.287 0.284 0.006 0.541 0.543 -0.021 
 (2.05)** (2.05)** (0.59) (2.36)** (2.38)** (1.55) 
Constant -8.964 -10.806 9.661 8.344 9.930 9.281 
 (1.28) (1.57) (15.00)*** (0.99) (1.20) (19.08)*** 
Observations 1097 1097 1097 1098 1098 1098 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.37 0.05 0.07 0.41 
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Table 5 Relationships between perks and cash compensation and future performance 
This table shows the relationships between perks and cash compensation and future firm performance. The dependent variable is ROA in one, 
two, and three years ahead respectively in Models (1) and (2), Models (3) and (4), and Models (5) and (6). The independent variables include the 
logarithm value PERKS1t plus one, the logarithm value PERKS2t plus one, the logarithm value COMPENSATIONt plus one, ROAt, return on 
assets, measured as the net income divided by the total assets at the end of year t, STATEt, an indicator variable, takes the value of 1 for state-
controlled firms, and 0 otherwise, LEVERAGEt, the ratio of total liability to total assets at the end of year t, MTBt, market-to-book equity ratio, 
measured as the ratio of market value to book value of equity at the end of year t, and LOG_SALESt, the logarithm value of total sales in year t. 
An OLS model with standard errors clustered by firm is applied. Yearly and industrial fixed effects are controlled but not reported.  *, **, and 
*** stand for statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
COMPENSATIONt 0.388 0.391 0.522 0.524 0.375 0.375 
 (3.28)*** (3.30)*** (3.70)*** (3.71)*** (2.08)** (2.08)** 
PERKS1t 0.030  0.034  0.032  
 (2.78)***  (2.49)**  (1.84)*  
PERKS2t  0.035  0.034  0.029 
  (3.07)***  (2.52)**  (1.68)* 
ROAt 0.421 0.421 0.253 0.253 0.211 0.211 
 (15.88)*** (15.89)*** (9.33)*** (9.33)*** (5.45)*** (5.46)*** 
LOG_SALESt 0.866 0.864 0.845 0.845 0.891 0.893 
 (7.91)*** (7.88)*** (6.85)*** (6.85)*** (5.89)*** (5.90)*** 
LEVERAGEt -4.380 -4.371 -4.862 -4.864 -3.970 -3.980 
 (6.87)*** (6.85)*** (6.42)*** (6.42)*** (3.93)*** (3.93)*** 
MTBt 0.366 0.366 0.286 0.287 0.158 0.160 
 (6.20)*** (6.21)*** (4.28)*** (4.30)*** (2.07)** (2.08)** 
Constant -21.517 -21.564 -24.218 -24.257 -23.805 -23.826 
 (9.63)*** (9.67)*** (9.01)*** (9.02)*** (7.05)*** (7.05)*** 
Observations 3925 3925 3855 3855 2806 2806 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.13 
 44 




High Performance Low Performance 
Low Cash 
Compensation 
Group 1 Group 3 
High Cash 
Compensation 
Group 4 Group 2 
 
 
 
 
 
